The MRAP: A Case Study in Military Planning (and Congressional Response)

Improvised Explosive Devises (IEDs) are the #1 killers of U.S. military personnel in Iraq. Suddenly, acquiring vast numbers of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles (MRAPs) -- is at the top of the military’s to-do list.

They should have seen it coming. That they didn’t, or worse, that they did and ignored the signs, is symptomatic of the Cold War mentality that still preoccupies our military and political leadership.

Two weeks ago the DoD approved the Army’s request to acquire 17,700 MRAPs. MRAPs are popular with U.S. forces because their V-shaped undersides, or “hulls,” help deflect the energy of roadside bombs or land mines away from the crew inside the vehicle, and provide much greater protection than even the armored version of the military’s ubiquitous High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles, or “Humvees.”

The Pentagon’s decision to dramatically ramp up procurement of MRAPs comes two months after Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced that the military would make replacing its fleet of Humvees a top priority. At the time, Sec. Gates told reporters that up-armored Humvees were “the best we had” but that now “…we have something better, and we're going to get that to the field as best we can.” [see the
Defense Department press conference, May 9, 2007.

Yes, MRAP has become the top priority of the military, with the Army, Marines Corps and other branches of the service seeking a total of 23,000 vehicles, and of Congress, which has already allocated $3 billion to the program earlier this year and is in the process of adding $4.6 billion more. Yet according to a story in today’s USA TODAY, reports by Pentagon analysts about the need for MRAPs reached the Joint Chiefs of Staff as early as December 2003, three and one-half years before Sec. Gates’s May announcement.

The specter of urban combat that planners feared prior to the invasion of Iraq did not materialize the way the U.S. military expected. Members of the Iraqi military shed their uniforms and melted into the civilian population rather than hunkering down in their cities. But such combat materialized nonetheless, as part of a complex insurgency that strikes at U.S. combat and support forces not just in urban areas, but also at their bases and along the known routes they must travel.

Neither the Bush Administration nor the military were adequately prepared for this eventuality. Politically, this myopia manifested itself in Vice President Dick Cheney’s now infamous comment on “Meet the Press” in March, 2003, which predicted that U.S. forces would be “greeted as liberators.” The military, which critics say arrived with an undersized force, was unable to safeguard Iraq’s infrastructure, including the vast amounts of military material at Saddam Hussein’s former bases.

The U.S. military’s initial response to the growing waves of insurgent attacks was to call for dramatically increasing supplies of personal body armor and the “up-armored” version of Humvees (although Congress can legitimately claim at least partial credit for responding to the perceived need by approving billions of dollars for these programs over the last several years.)

Up-armoring Humvees could never be more than a stop-gap measure – a view reflected by then-Marine Corps Major Roy McGriff III. In a 2003 paper, cited in the USA TODAY article, Maj. McGriff wrote “…our underprotected vehicles result in casualties that are politically untenable and militarily unnecessary. Failure to build a MRAP vehicle fleet…will substantially increase” risks for the military. The Humvee was a replacement for the venerable Jeep, albeit with vastly greater capability, but it was never intended to be the mainstay of an occupation force in a hostile environment. It simply was not designed for that type of work load.

That the “round peg” Humvee was forced into the “square-holed” role it finds itself in Iraq is symptomatic of the old military axiom of preparing to fight the last war. The predominance of Army and Marine land forces are heavy (armored) vehicles like the M1 tank and Bradley Fighting Vehicle, or thin-skinned vehicles like the Humvee. Prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq there were virtually no examples of hybrids in the U.S. arsenal. Even the up-armored version of the Humvee was in short supply.

This situation, intentionally or not, demonstrates the limitations of one of the essential components of what has become known as the "Powell Doctrine;" that military force, when used, should be overwhelming and disproportionate to the force used by the enemy. It helps explain why the U.S. military has dominated the traditional battlefield in Iraq, both in 1991 and the spring of 2003, and yet is inadequately prepared for the current insurgency. To put it another way, the U.S. military has plenty of hammers in its tool box and knows how to use them, but it’s short on crowbars.

Finally, the response of the Pentagon and Congress to the need for the MRAP is typical; a sluggish, inertia-riddled effort to address an under-appreciated problem, transiting at near light-speed to a hyper-reaction once overdue attention elevates the situation to “criticality.” Neither approach is healthy, yet the cycle repeats itself within government again and again.

ANALYSIS: The Iraq Study Group Does Not Call For Withdrawal of All U.S. Military Forces

Today the Senate will likely consider an amendment offered by Senator Ken Salazar (D-CO) and Senator Lamar Alexander (R-TN) which would make the findings of the Iraq Study Group (ISG) the basis for future U.S. policy in Iraq. While the ISG recommended significant changes in U.S. policy in Iraq, it did not call for an immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops, and it envisioned a long-term, substantial deployment of U.S. military forces in the region.

The Iraq Study Group was a bi-partisan commission chaired by former Secretary of State James Baker and former Member of Congress Lee Hamilton. Its 84 page report makes recommendations based on the political, economic and military situation in Iraq. It issued its report in December 2006. [You can find the full text of the ISG report on the U.S. Institute of Peace website at: http://www.usip.org/isg/iraq_study_group_report/report/1206/index.html]

The ISG report speaks specifically about the future role of the U.S. military in Iraq. In the section entitled “A Military Strategy for Iraq,” the report begins:

“There is no action the American military can take that, by itself, can bring about success in Iraq.” [pg. 48]

But…

“…there are actions that the U.S. and Iraqi governments, working together, can and should take to increase the probability of avoiding disaster there, and increase the chance of success.” [pg. 48]

The primary steps needed to improve the situation in Iraq, according to the ISG, require that:

“The Iraqi government should accelerate the urgently needed national reconciliation program to which it has already committed. And it should accelerate assuming responsibility for Iraqi security by increasing the number and quality of Iraqi Army brigades. As the Iraqi Army increases in size and capability, the Iraqi government should be able to take real responsibility for governance.” [pg. 48]

During this process, the United States “should significantly increase the number of U.S. military personnel, including combat troops, imbedded in and supporting Iraqi Army units.” [pg. 48] These imbedded forces would advise and train Iraqi forces so that they could increasingly take over the security mission in Iraq.

According to the ISG, the role of U.S. forces in Iraq would be a much more limited one. As Iraqi forces take on an increasing share of the security burden, “we could begin to move combat forces out of Iraq. The primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq should evolve to one of supporting the Iraqi army, which would take over primary responsibility for combat operations. We should continue to maintain support forces, rapid-reaction forces, special operations forces, intelligence units, search-and-rescue units, and force protection units.” [Pg. 48]

But the ISG does not envision an immediate end to the role of the U.S. military in Iraq:

“Even after the United States has moved all combat brigades out of Iraq, we would maintain a considerable military presence in the region, with our still significant force in Iraq and with our powerful air, ground, and naval deployments in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar...” [pg. 49]

The ISG did look at the possibility of substantially increasing the U.S. military presence in Iraq. It considered, and rejected, proposals to significantly increase U.S. combat forces by 100,000 to 200,000. The ISG rejected the idea because it felt that such levels were unsustainable with the current U.S. military force structure, and because it felt that such an increase might worsen the security situation by re-enforcing the notion of the United States as an army of occupation.

The ISG did say, however, that it could support "a short-term redeployment or surge of American combat forces to stabilize Baghdad, or to speed up the training and equipping mission..." [pg. 50]

Further, the ISG opposed an immediate pull-out of U.S. troops. “We also rejected the immediate withdrawal of our troops, because we believe that so much is at stake.”
[pg. 50]